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Using a Cultural Lens in the Law School Classroom
to Stimulate Self-Assessment
Julie M. Spanbauer
"The great end of education is to discipline rather than to furnish the mind;
to train it to the use of its own powers rather than to fill it with the
accumulation of others."
ABSTRACT
The American Bar Association is exerting pressure on United States law
schools to improve teaching effectiveness by shifting the evaluation of student
learning away from input measures to focus upon output-based assessments.
Yet, many legal educators appear to be resistant to and fearful of change, in
part,perhaps, due to their comfort with teaching methods such as the Socratic
or case-dialogue approach, which demands little accountabilityfor teaching
effectiveness andprovides more time for the pursuit of the traditionalgoals of
scholarly productivity. This method of teaching as currently utilized in law
schools is also innately professor-centric performance art. The article
provides examples and exercises that demonstrate that any teaching method
will be enhanced if a professor adopts a "cross-cultural"approach to teaching
first-semester andfirst-year law students. A "cross-cultural" approach shifts
the focus in the classroom to the students to assist them in becoming aware of
the cultural contexts they bring to the study of law, enabling them to compare
*
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their culturalperspective with the shifting culturalcontext of the law. Not only
will this shift in classroomfocus teach law students to become lifelong students
of the law by critically self-assessing their learning, but it will additionally
enrich a professor's scholarship. It does so because the professor who elicits
and responds to the cultural perspectives of students in the classroom will
better understand societal perceptions of the law, which will provide new
avenuesfor traditionaland nontraditionalscholarship.
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INTRODUCTION

Law schools are experiencing intense pressure from a variety of internal
and external sources to modify, perhaps radically, the manner in which lawyers
are educated in this country.' The source of the most intense and immediate
pressure is the American Bar Association ("ABA") Section of Legal Education
Council and Accreditation Committee,2 whose proposed changes to the
accreditation standards advocate, among other modifications, a shift in the

See infra notes 2-7, 13-16 and accompanying text.
1.
Pursuant to Title 34, Chapter VI, § 602 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the
2.
Council and the Accreditation Committee of the ABA section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar are recognized by the United States Department of Education (DOE)
as the accrediting agency for programs that lead to the J.D. degree. In this function, the
Council and the Section are separate and independent from the ABA, as required by DOE
regulations. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
available at
(2010),
3
PROCESS
ACCREDITATION
SCHOOL
LAW
THE
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2010-aba_
accreditation brochure. authcheckdam.pdf "The American Bar Association, through its
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, establishes standards for the
accreditation of law schools and applies the Standards through its Accreditation Project,
which approves new schools and conducts sabbatical reviews of existing schools." Gary A.
Munneke, Managing A Law Practice: What You Need to Learn in Law School, 30 PACE L.
REv. 1207, 1211-12 n.19 (2010).
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evaluation process away from input measures3 to a focus upon output-based
assessments.4 The stated objective is to focus on "what law students actually

3.

The current ABA STANDARDS

AND

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL

at
available
STANDARDS]
are
http://www.abanet.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2012_2
013 aba standardsand rules.autheeckdam.pdf. The proposed accreditation standards can
OF

LAW

SCHOOLS

[hereinafter

ABA

be found at Standards Review Committee, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
THE
BAR,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
ADMISSIONS
TO

legal education/committees/standards review.html. Input measures, as reflected in the
current standards include the following: "a law school's facility, faculty size, and budget."
Cassandra L. Hill, Peer Editing: A Comprehensive Pedagogical Approach to Maximize
Assessment Opportunities, Integrate Collaborative Learning, and Achieve Desired
Outcomes, 11 NEv. L.J. 667, 667 (2011).
4.
The current ABA Standards do incorporate "bar passage and job placement"
statistics and outcome measures. Janet W. Fisher, Putting Students at the Center of Legal
Education: How an Emphasis on Outcome Measures in the ABA Standardsfor Approval of
Law Schools Might Transform the Educational Experience of Law Students, 35 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 225, 226-27 (2011). Proposed Accreditation Standard 302 states:
(a) A law school shall identify, define, and disseminate each of the learning
outcomes it seeks for its graduating students and for its program of legal education.
(b) The learning outcomes shall include competency as an entry-level practitioner
in the following areas:
(1) knowledge and understanding of substantive law, legal theory and procedure;
(2) the professional skills of:
(i) legal analysis and reasoning, critical thinking, legal research, problem solving,
written and oral communication in a legal context; and
(ii) the exercise of professional judgment consistent with the values of the legal
profession and professional duties to society, including recognizing and resolving
ethical and other professional dilemmas.
(3) a depth in and breadth of other professional skills sufficient for effective,
responsible and ethical participation in the legal profession; and
(4) knowledge and understanding of the following values:
(i) ethical responsibilities as representatives of clients, officers of the courts, and
public citizens responsible for the quality and availability of justice;
(ii) the legal profession's values of justice, fairness, candor, honesty, integrity,
professionalism, respect for diversity and respect for the rule of law; and
(iii) responsibility to ensure that adequate legal services are provided to those who
cannot afford to pay for them.
(5) any other learning outcomes the school identifies as necessary or important to
meet the needs of its students and to accomplish the school's mission and goals.
ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Standards Review Committee
Draft for April 2011 Meeting, 2-3 (Apr. 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/
committees/Standards%20Review%20documents/April%202011%20Meeting/Report%20of
%20Subcommittee%20on%2OStudent%2OLeaming%200utcomes%20%28redline%20to%2
OStandards%29.pdf.
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take away from their educational experiences." The ABA is additionally
proposing that law student assessment measures include "a variety of formative
and summative assessment methods across the curriculum to provide
meaningful feedback to students." 6 As a result, faculty members have been
compelled to engage in comprehensive curriculum review, designed to
incorporate methodology that provides students with increased data that
measures their learning process. 7
Recently, some law schools have started valuing and rewarding innovative
teaching and assessment methods as well as scholarship devoted to pedagogy.
Nevertheless, law schools have historically placed a much higher value on
traditional legal scholarship than on classroom teaching.9 Therefore, the proposed changes to the ABA accreditation standards must be understood in the
context of a system that has remained static for at least the past 130 years, in
which many faculty members have spent their entire careers teaching in a
modified "Socratic case-dialogue" 0 method in combination with lecture. 1 A
single comprehensive final examination at the end of the course also remains
the standard, dominant form of assessment in law schools.12 This traditional
5.
Hill, supra note 3, at 667-68.
ABA proposed accreditation Standard 304 defines formative and summative
6.
assessment methods as follows: "Formative assessment methods are measurements at
different points during a particular course or over the span of a student's education that
provide meaningful feedback to improve student learning. Summative assessment methods
are measurements at the culmination of a particular course or the culmination of any part of a
student's legal education that measures the degree of student learning." Draftfor April 2011
Meeting, supra note 4, at 5-6.
See Fisher,supra note 4, at 234-35 (identifying the dean, who is answerable to
7.
the ABA, as playing "a key role in the development and implementation of assessment for
the entire institution" and identifying as crucial to success "faculty development programs
about how to do assessment").
Fisher, supra note 4, at 235.
8.
Dennis R. Honabach, Responding to "EducatingLawyers ": An HereticalEssay
9.
in Support ofAbolishing Teaching Evaluations, 39 U. TOL. L. Rev. 311, 317 (2008) (arguing
that "differences in merit raises tend to reflect scholarly productivity more than effective
teaching," that "summer stipends are more readily available to promote new scholarship than
to improve teaching," and that "the production of cutting edge scholarship is the key to a
faculty member's mobility.").
William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S.
10.
Shulman, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING

LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 3 (Jossey-Bass 2007) [hereinafter
CARNEGIE REPORT].

Robert J. Rhee, On Legal Education and Reform: One View Formedfrom
11.
Diverse Perspectives, 70 MD. L. Rev. 310, 334 (2011) (describing as "chief pedagogical
tools-the Socratic method or a mix of lecture and discussion").
12.

CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 162. "This one-shot, do-or-die assessment
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system is broadly believed to support minimal faculty effort in teaching in
order to afford faculty greater time to invest in scholarship. 3
Public opinion also contributes to the impetus for improving teaching
effectiveness in law schools. A weak economy in which law students are
graduating with more and more debt,14 coupled with the inability of graduates
to secure desirable employment, has resulted in a harsh public response, as
evidenced in articles appearing in the New York Times and other newspapers
that question the value of a law degree.16 Despite this confluence of events and
circumstances, many legal educators may be resistant to and fearful of change.
Law faculty appear to be most comfortable in a milieu that demands little
accountability for teaching effectiveness and more time for the pursuit of the
traditional goals of scholarly productivity.
This article suggests that faculty resistance to public pressure and ABA
directives is an overreaction that reflects a lack of understanding of teaching
effectiveness and student assessment. The ultimate purpose of this article is not
to present innovative pedagogy or to propose novel methods for assessment.
method has received harsh criticism that it lacks validity, reliability, and fairness." Earl
Martin & Gerald Hess, Developing a Skills and Professionalism Curriculum-Processand
Product,41 U. TOL. L. Rev. 327, 331-32 (2010).
13.
See supra note 9.
The average law student graduating from a private university does so with
14.
approximately $100,000 in debt. Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun Abraham, Options for
Student Borrowers: A Derivatives-BasedProposal to Protect Students and Control DebtFueled Inflation in the Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 69 n.3
(2010). FOR the last 30 years, the cost of legal education has risen steadily; "Between 1992
and 2002 . . . the cost of legal education rose 134 percent at public schools and 76 percent at
private schools. Since 2002, tuition has continued to rise anywhere from 5 to 15 percent a
year." Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical
Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 608 (2010).
15.
The National Association for Law Placement reported that sixty-four percent of
law students who graduated in 2010 "reported having full-time jobs that require a law degree
within nine months of graduation." Katherine Mangan, In Tight Job Market, Some Want Bar
Association to Toughen Law-School Accreditation Standards, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.
(July 31, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Bar-Association-Is-Urged-to/128441/. For those
graduates fortunate enough to obtain employment, "the median starting salary fell by nearly
13 percent for 2010 graduates versus 2009 graduates, to $63,000." Id.
16.
David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, at
BU1, availableat http://www.Nytimes.com/2011/07/17/business/law-school-economics-jobmarket-weakens-tuition-rises.htnl; Bryan A. Garner, Op-Ed., Three Years, Better Spent,
at 01
available at http://www.nytimes.com/
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011,
Roomfordebate/2011/07/21/the-case-against-law-school/three-years-in-law-school-spentbetter; Amanda Robert, Recent Grads Question Decision to Go To Law School, CHI. LAW.,
Aug. 1, 2011, 19, 19-21.
17.
Segal, supra note 16. See supra note 9.
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Such work is being done by others.' 8 The goals of this article are much more
modest. Part I of this article examines the predominant teaching method in
United States law schools and concludes that regardless of its origins, this
methodology is innately professor-centric because it is largely a performance
art. 19 Part II of this article analyzes the benefits of adopting a "crosscultural" approach to classroom teaching with first-semester and first-year
students and concludes that such an approach will benefit both faculty and
students in assessment and self-assessment of student learning.20 Part III provides examples and exercises suitable for first-semester and first-year law
students to illustrate this "cross-cultural" approach to legal education and to
demonstrate how small changes in focus can reap substantial benefits. 21 An
understanding of these approaches should move faculty members away from
resistance and fear, allowing them to focus upon output and assessment
measures.
Ultimately, this article seeks to assure faculty that innovative, culturally
sensitive teaching methodologies are not overly burdensome, nor will they
operate to de-emphasize the role of traditional scholarship. Particularly
through the utilization of cross-cultural methods, a professor should find the
classroom experience to be one that actually informs both traditional and nontraditional scholarship because it provides a window to the relationship
between contemporary culture and the law.22

18.
Kate Nace Day & Russell G. Murphy, "Just Trying to be Human in this Place
Storytelling and Film in the First-Year Law School Classroom, 39 STETSON L. REV. 247,
252, 257-64 (2009) (describing the benefits of using storytelling and movies in first-year
Criminal Law and Constitutional Law courses); Hill, supra note 3, at 670-678 (urging
collaborative peer editing); examples of assessment methods currently utilized at some law
schools include the following: Rogelio A. Lasso, Is our Students Learning? Using
Assessments to Measure and Improve Law School Learning and Performance, 15 BARRY L.
REv. 73, 96-97 (advocating among other types of assessment methods, "self-evaluated and
computerized" assessment measures and "criterion-referenced" essay problems); some of the
innovative pedagogy has been introduced by "law professors entering legal education today"
and has included active learning techniques in the form of "role-playing, group exercises,
simulations, and live-client clinics." Amy R. Mashburn, Can Xenophon Save the Socratic
Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 597, 627 (2008).

19.
See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
20.
See infra notes 44-78 and accompanying text.
21.
See infra notes 79-134 and accompanying text.
22.
Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship,
40 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 368, 370 n.10 (1990) (discussing the "dualist model," which asserts
"that classroom teaching brings a faculty member into regular contact with the sometimes
novel ideas and questions of students which in turn informs and enriches the faculty
member's scholarship.").
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CLASSROOM TEACHING Is NOT PERFORMANCE ART

For years, when a colleague returned to his office after teaching and was
asked, "How was class?" that colleague would invariably respond with a wry
smile: "I was nothing short of magnificent." This beloved teacher's playful
comment reflects an underlying belief-system for many within the legal
academy who view teaching as a performance-a one-way street, in which a
23
body of material is transmitted. This myopic focus exclusively on the
professor's performance can result in the disjunction between teaching and
learning when it manifests, for example, through student questions that reveal a
basic misunderstanding about the material or when students' final examination
answers reveal a consistent misunderstanding of a core course concept or of a
fundamental reality about the nature of the United States' legal system.24
The dominant or signature law school pedagogy reinforces a focus on the
professor as the center of the classroom rather than focusing on the students'
learnmg process. 25
In many ways, a Socratic professor functions as a conductor or puppet
master, carefully orchestrating the questions and arguments to guide
the discourse in a preordained direction. A case method classroom
therefore centers on the professor himself, and the students typically
view the professor as holding the truth to the subject, but rarely
revealing it. 26
The advocates of a modified Socratic or case-dialogue approach to law
school teaching defend it despite its origins in formalism, which have long
23.
The Socratic method was never intended to be thought of as a vehicle for "the
transmission of some substantive body of knowledge." Douglas Lind, Book Review, 60 J.
Legal Educ. 705, 720 (2011) (THOMAS D. EISELE, BITTER KNOWLEDGE: LEARNING THE
SOCRATIC LESSONS OF DISSOLUSION AND RENEWAL (2009)). The trend in other countries is
away from a content-based focus in legal education. Mashburn, supra note 18, at 637 &
n.184.
24.
The Carnegie report asserts that academic scholars and students have expressed
"puzzlement, frustration, and anguish" with the exceedingly stressful practice of the single,
comprehensive examination format, finding it to be "unfair, counterproductive,
demoralizing, and arbitrary " Emily Zimmerman, An Interdisciplinary Framework for
Understandingand CultivatingLaw Student Enthusiasm, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 881 n. 158
(2009) (quoting WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW

165 (2007)).
25.
Jess M. Krannich, James R. Holbrook, & Julie J. McAdams, Beyond "Thinking
Like a Lawyer" and the Traditional Legal Paradigm: Toward a Comprehensive View of
Legal Education, 86 DENv. U. L. REv. 381, 384 (2009).
26.
Id.
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since been criticized by members of the academy.27 The
Socratic
method
28
persists "'less as doctrine and more as process."' Many professors continue
to believe that through the question and answer process, students will learn to
"think like a lawyer":
[A]t its best, through this version of the Socratic method, "[t]he teacher
leads the students to generalizations and inferences regarding the
subject matter under study, and prompts the student. In effect, the
teacher says to the student, 'If you wish to know, you must exert your
own intellectual effort. You must work with the data from experience
yourself. Through your own inquiry will come knowledge."' 29
The case-dialogue or modified Socratic teaching method as practiced by
many professors is not in itself attuned to student learning. 30 In fact, it may be
characterized as largely indifferent to student learning because the purpose and
goals of this teaching method are rarely communicated to students and because
students are not generally given feedback or assessment as a part of this
process.31
The problem with the Socratic method as practiced in today's classroom
lies . .. in the teacher's complete failure to explain the purpose to first semester
students combined with its formalistic roots. Given this combination of factors,
it is no wonder that the first-semester student, as novice legal thinker, is often
seduced into a search for the right answer. First-semester teachers also rarely
take the time to summarize and evaluate classroom discussion. This omission
compounds the potential for reinforcing poor reasoning and logical errors. In
order to learn to "think like a lawyer," students need to be told "when an
argument is circular" and when they have made "factual misstatements" or
when they have "mistaken cause-and-effect relationships." Without this kind of

27.
See Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
1271, 1273 (2010). But see id. at 1275 (asserting that the Socratic method was "not so much
a retreat to formalism as it was an escape from learning by passive absorption of conclusions
about the law to a regime of learning by original study and critique ofjudicial decisions.").
28.
Julie M. Spanbauer, Teaching First-SemesterStudents that Objective Analysis
Persuades,5 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 167, 173 (1999) (quoting Steven Alan

Childress, The Baby and the Bathwater: Salvaging a Positive Socratic Method, 7 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REV. 333, 336 (1982)).
29.
Spanbauer, supra note 28, at 174 (quoting June Cicero, Piercing the Socratic

Veil: Adding an Active Learning Alternative in Legal Education, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1011, 1012-13 (1989)).

30.

Id.

31.

Id.
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feedback, they will not understand the purpose of the Socratic method, and they
will not be empowered to make and anticipate sound legal arguments. 32
Not only are entering law students frequently mystified by the purpose of
the Socratic or case-dialogue approach to legal education, they are also jarred
by the interactive nature of the law school classroom, which frequently includes
involuntary participation.33 All of this is unfamiliar and, very likely, unsettling
to first-year law students, many of whom "attended mostly large, anonymous
undergraduate classes, in which they may not have been required to attend or
participate in any manner and from which they received little personalized
feedback."3 4 Many entering law students are, therefore, ill-equipped to engage
in oral and written communication and in critical reasoning simply because the
large first-year law school classroom is a frightening and confusing arena.35
Moreover, these same students are not learning from conventional
textbooks and secondary sources typically used in other disciplines. 36 Instead,
they are attempting to learn by reading primarily redacted cases, which were
never intended as teaching material and which were written by legal experts
(judges) to resolve a narrow legal dispute with other legal experts (i.e. lawyers)
as the intended audience. 37 The dominant nature of this reading material is
dense, filled with legal jargon and procedural and other technical legal
complexities the students cannot possibly understand at the outset. 38 Given the
32.
33.

Spanbauer, supra note 28, at 175.
Mashburn, supra note 18, at 621.

34.

Id at 633.

35.
Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Promoting Mental Health in Law School: What Law
Schools Can Do for Law Students to Help Them Become Happy, Mentally Healthy Lawyers,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 95,104-05 (2009).

36.
M.H. Sam Jacobson, The Curse of Tradition in the Law School Classroom:
What CasebookProfessors Can Learn From Those Professors Who Teach Legal Writing, 61
MERCER L. REv. 899, 908 (2010) A textbook "provides students with the information needed
for the course in a textual format." Id. In contrast, a casebook is "a compilation of cases
organized in some topical fashion. Someone could read a textbook and understand the
subject matter, but no novice learner could simply read a casebook and understand the
subject matter." Id.

37.

See id. at 908-09.

38.
See id. at 906;
[T]he case method "attempt[s] too much" for the time available and the capacity of
the average student and ... to plunge a student into this chaos [of cases], with his
powers untried and imperfect, and his knowledge of principles incomplete, to
grope his way through it as best he may, and to triangulate from case to case,
supposing that he is getting forward when he is only going astray, is not to educate
him, but tends rather to make him proof against education.
W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REv. 1, 84 (1997) (internal quotes
omitted) (quoting Edward J. Phelps, Methods of Legal Education, 1 Yale L. J. 139, 141
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tailored and individualized dispute-resolution purpose of each case, the reading
material inevitably provides an incomplete and myopic synthesis of any area of
law. 39 Many professors have "increasingly blended the Socratic method with
other, less confrontational approaches, such as lectures, discussions, simulation
exercises and problem-solving sessions."40 Regardless, professors still must
intentionally shift the focus to students' learning rather than to the transmission
of knowledge. If this shift does not occur, the professors will remain the
41
central focus and students will continue to struggle.
While tradition and inertia have undoubtedly perpetuated the predominant
teaching method in United States law school classrooms, its ultimate
effectiveness is transparently questionable.42 More than likely, the prevailing
methods remain entrenched because professors have not been exposed to
alternative models and because professors are concerned that adopting new
methodologies will diminish their time to engage in traditional scholarship.4 3
The following sections of this article introduce some alternative teaching
approaches that are designed to make the classroom experience more
meaningful and productive for both the professor and the student.
Simultaneously, these approaches will teach students to engage in a process of
self-assessment, which is integral to a progressively deepening understanding
of the law.
II.

ADOPTING A CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACH TO
THE FIRST-YEAR LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM

Regardless of whether a professor retains a more traditional approach to
teaching or adopts a mix of traditional and innovative teaching techniques,
shifting focus to the students and their learning can readily be accomplished if a
professor adopts a simple change embracing a view of first-year students as
(1892)).
39.
See id. at 84; See also Phelps, supra note 38, at 141.
40.
Mashburn, supra note 18, at 621.
41.
Carter, supra note 38, at 97 (asserting that the "Socratic method" evolved during
the twentieth century as a pedagogy that "placed the teacher at center stage"). See also
Sandra R. Klein, Legal Education in the United States and England: A Comparative
Analysis, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 601, 630 (1991) (arguing that "the Socratic
method focuses on teaching rather than learning, since the method of instruction centers on
the professor who is asking the questions, rather than the student").
42.
See Spanbauer,supra note 28, at 175.
43.
See Ruth v. McGregor, Response to Bang Goes the Theory-Debunking
Traditional Legal Education, 3 PHOENIX L. REv. 343, 344 (2010) (responding to assertion
"that law professors use the Socratic method primarily because it is easier to use that
approach than to use other teaching methods").
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"cultural outsiders."4 Viewing students as "cultural outsiders" and adopting a
cross-cultural approach to legal education may, at times, include equating
entering law students with students from other countries for whom English is a
second language ("ESL")45 and for whom United States culture and the United
States legal system are unfamiliar and foreign.46 Given the fact that entering
law students are encountering a new discourse and culture complete with
distinct conventions and vocabulary, treatment of students as "cultural
outsiders" is certainly warranted.4 7 This focus on law students as "cultural
outsiders" is further reinforced by the demographics of contemporary law
student classes. In recent years, the law school classroom has become more
multicultural with ethnic and racial minorities comprising more than twenty
percent of the J.D. student population. 48 "Research documents that although
many of these students do not speak English as a second language, they often
experience feelings of isolation as they prepare to enter a largely white
profession . . . due to the fact that they are not a part of the dominant culture

and are instead surrounded by a largely white student body, with few faculty
role models."49
A student-as-cultural-outsider perspective may further enable a professor to
understand the ways in which these same students have been influenced by
"law as a culturalprojection-not necessarily understood through any detailed

acquaintance with its practice, doctrine, or effects but perceived in terms of
constructed images or fictional narratives. 50 These constructed images and
44.
The phrase, "cultural outsider," is sometimes limited to ethnic, racial, and other
minority students, but for purposes of this article is intended to describe anyone "for whom
the normative assumptions of law" are foreign. See Barbara J. Flagg, Experimenting with
Problem-Based Learning in ConstitutionalLaw, 10 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 101, 108 n.18,
109(2002).
45.
ESL students are students "whose first or official language is not English." Julie
M. Spanbauer, Lost in Translation in the Law School Classroom: Assessing Required
Coursework in LL.M Programsfor InternationalStudents, 35 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 396, 397
n. 1 (2007).
46.
Id. at 419. These students "need training in or exposure to sociolinguistic and
cultural norms." Id.
47.
Id. at 443-46.
48.
Since early 2000, minority students have "comprised more than 20 percent of
the total J.D. enrollment in ABA- accredited law schools." Andrew Brenton, Comment,
Overcoming the Equal Pay Act and Title VII: Why Federal Sex-Based Employment
DiscriminationLaws Should be Replaced with a System for Accrediting Employers for their
AntidiscriminatoryEmployment Practices,26 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 349, 383 (2011).
49.
Julie M. Spanbauer & Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Embracing Diversity Through a
MulticulturalApproach to Legal Education, 1 CHARLOTTE L. REv. 223, 224 (2009).
50.
Roger Cotterrell, Law in Culture, 17 RATIO JURIS. 1, 5 (Mar. 2004). For
purposes of this article, culture is simply defined as a process "by which meaning is
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narratives not only influence lay expectations, but also profoundly influence the
law itself. In fact, some scholars assert that "[m]ass-mediated images" have
become "as powerful, pervasive, and important as are other early twenty-firstcentury social forces-for example, globalization, neo-colonialism, and human
rights-in shaping and transforming legal life."51 Failing to recognize the
cultural dimension of both perception and function would inevitably diminish
the teaching and leaming of the function of law in contemporary society.52
A cultural outsider approach to legal education does not require dramatic
reform in the classroom, nor does it demand that the professor adopt any
particular normative view of culture. The idea that law is one powerful
"institutional cultural actor whose diverse agents (legislators, judges, civil
the
servants, citizens) order and reorder meanings" is not novel. 3 In fact,
ramifications of a social constructivist view of law and culture have been
explored for decades by legal realists, pragmatists, members of the critical legal
studies movement, and critical race and critical feminist theorists. 54
Consequently, resources are readily available to assist a professor in using this
approach with virtually any subject matter.55
produced, performed, contested, or transformed" through "any set of signifying practices."
Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 42 (2001).
Anthony Chase, The Real French Constitution, 30 NOVA L. REv. 209, 210
51.
(2006).
52.
See id.
53.
Mezey, supra note 50, at 45.
Spanbauer & Lewinbuk, supra note 49, at 233 & n. 61. As one author
54.
explained,
Law engenders a complex, hermeneutic process which includes its own specialized
language and its own shared knowledge, i.e., "legal culture." The field of law (or
legal culture) has a recognizable internal organization based on "protocols and
assumptions, characteristic behaviors and self-sustaining values" forming an
incomplete but autonomous social field. Law is also fundamentally constitutive.
"Law is intimately involved in the constitution of social relations and the law itself
is constituted through social relations." Law could be said to operate inseparably
from society, and therefore, from culture. Law is local knowledge, a cultural
institution comprising complex processes which vary from place to place and
period to period. Law, therefore, may be characterized as a component of culture
and the relationship between law and culture is dynamic and creative. The study of
law has shallow meaning when abstracted from its cultural context.
Gloria M. Sanchez, A Paradigm Shift in Legal Education: PreparingLaw Students for the
Twenty-First Century: Teaching Foreign Law, Culture, and Legal Language of the Major
U.S. American TradingPartners,34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 635, 650-51 (1997).
For "[a] sampling of the recent books addressing law and culture," see
55.
Spanbauer & Lewinbuk, supra note 49, at n.63. Foundation Press has also "released a series
of books designed to provide a legal, political, and social context for some of the standard
cases used in contract law, tax, civil procedure, constitutional law, criminal procedure,
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However, the purpose of a cultural approach as advocated in this article is
different from the often-cited reason that cultural context is necessary "to
provide students with a broad perspective and better understanding of the law
and to enable students to make their own normative decisions."56 Instead, the
cultural approach as promoted in this article acts as a means of shifting the
focus away from the professor and toward the students' learning process so that
both the professor and the student are in a better position to assess student
learning. Because "[c]lassroom talk is deeply embedded in culture,"57 the professor who recognizes that these students are "cultural outsiders" is better
equipped to identify and anticipate the ramifications to the first-year law school
classroom and to the larger legal culture. "Cultural outsiders" will struggle
with analysis governed by a largely deductive analytical paradigm and a system
of analogy and distinction of precedent.5 Distilled to its essence, students will
be participants in a learning process that teaches law as something more than
discreet abstractions. 59
If a professor remains attuned to the phenomenon that all entering law
students bring with them a view of law influenced by the larger cultures within
which they have lived, the professor will be in a position to navigate the
inevitable dichotomy of the cultural context within which the law evolved and
the cultural contexts of students' perception of the law. 60 This focus on cultural
gaps in student expectations will provide a professor with immediate feedback
in the classroom as to both student understanding and misunderstanding.
Further, such a focus will allow the professor to capitalize on such gaps as
teaching moments to demonstrate to the students how their cultural perceptions
differ from embedded legal cultural assumptions and the historical assumptions
that motivated lawmakers to adopt particular laws.61 However, it will do so
only when the professor demonstrates sensitivity to cultural dichotomies and
employment discrimination, environmental law, immigration law, intellectual property law,
labor law, property law, and torts law courses. See, e.g., CONTRACT STORIES (Douglas G.
Baird ed., 2007)." Spanbauer & Lewinbuk, supra note 49, at n.151.
56.
Spanbauer & Lewinbuk, supra note 49, at 233.
57.

Spanbauer, supra note 45, at 421 (quoting ULLA CONNOR, CONTRASTIVE

RHETORIC: CROSS-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF SECOND- LANGUAGE WRITING 23 (1996)).

58.

Id. at 402-03. See also Jessie C. Grearson, Teaching the Transitions, 4

LEGAL

WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 57 (1998).

59.

Grearson, supra note 58, at 58.
See Anthony Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the
Metacognitive Skills of Law Students Through More Effective Formative Assessment
Techniques, 40 Cap. U. L. Rev. 149, 193 (2012) (advocating the use of various selfassessment tools to aid students in the development of metacognitive skills and to provide
"the professor with more information to assess their students' learning").
61.
Id. at 192.

60.
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receptivity to a teaching process which permits students to share their own
cultural perspectives.
Students who are made aware of their own cultural perceptions will, in
turn, be in a better position to self-assess their learning and understanding of
the law.62 Simultaneously, they will be able to better examine the cultural
influences driving the law and the shifting historical perspective of the law over
time. 63 Students who learn to question their cultural assumptions in this way,
as well as the cultural assumptions they identify as underlying various aspects
of the law, will develop some of the "critical self-learning skills" necessary to
their professional growth as attorneys:
A most important aspect of assessment is student self-assessment.
Throughout an attorney's professional life after law school, her success
in practice will depend on the ability to self-assess professional
performance, behavior, and attitudes. "An indispensible trait of the
truly competent lawyer, at whatever stage of career development, is
that of knowing the extent and limits of his competence: what he can
do and what requires the assistance of others."6 5
A cultural approach can be implemented in any subject area.66 For purposes of illustration, this article will focus on employment discrimination-based
problems because they have proven to be effective when used in a firstsemester legal research and writing course or in any introduction to the legal
system of the United States. Studies have demonstrated that a majority of
adults have had personal experience with the concept of discrimination (either
through family members, friends, or first-hand experiences) and, as a result,
entering law students will have definite views of what does and does not
67
constitute discrimination. These views of discrimination vary depending
upon cultural perspective, thus providing an opportunity for classroom
exploration of multiple points of view of the concept of discrimination.
In this way, students will self-consciously begin to understand law as "a symbol
62.
of cultural inheritance. Like language, law evolves and grows. Yet . . . it also necessarily
retains a sense of cultural homogeneity and gains its essential meanings (its implicit criteria
of interpretation and evaluation) from its rootedness in the traditional cultural matrix-the
inherited environment." Cotterrell, supra note 50, at 6.
63.
Id.
Lasso, supra note 18, at 96.
64.
65.
Id.
See supranote 55 and accompanying text.
66.
Gina J. Chirichigno, Comment, Crying Wol? What We Can Learn From
67.
"Misconceptions" About Discrimination: A Transformational Approach to AntiDiscriminationLaw, 49 How. L.J. 553, 572 (2006).
68.
Theorists advocate numerous reasons for differing views of discrimination. "A
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Moreover, the moral and legal issues implicated in an employment
discrimination scenario evoke strong emotional responses and will thereby
naturally engage students. 69 Finally, students are frequently surprised to learn
that their strong responses stand in sharp contrast to the technical, narrow legal
concept of discrimination as reflected in federal, state, and local employment
discrimination laws. These same students are also sometimes surprised to learn
that state and local employment discrimination legislation frequently leads the
way in changing outmoded concepts of discrimination and that federal
legislation lags behind current sociological and psychological understandings
of discriminatory attitudes and behavior. 70 These cultural dichotomies in
person's self-concept, their identification with a particular racial group, and their concept of
what that membership entails, will influence their views on discrimination." Id at 568.
Some experts assert that members of minority groups who frequently experience
discrimination more readily detect discrimination. Id. at 571. Other scholars argue "that
those who experience discrimination somehow find the phenomenon more significant than
those who do not." Id. at 572. Empirical evidence supporting the view that members of
protected classes and those who experience discrimination are more likely to view a situation
as involving discrimination is, however, "sparse." Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A
Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 801, 803 (2006).

69.
Such strong reactions should not be surprising given the fact that employment
discrimination involves two very significant harms-harm to an individual's property
interest in employment and personal injury involving "personal dignity." Ann C. McGinley,
Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge
Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1450 (1996).
70.
Id Some scholars describe the application of the McDonnell Douglas test,
applied in cases alleging individual disparate treatment or intentional discrimination, as
being "too mechanical in practice." Chirichigno, supra note 67, at 584. The test as originally
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1973 requires a plaintiff to set forth the
following prima facie case: (1) The plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) The
plaintiff is qualified; (3) The plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) The
plaintiff was treated differently than other similarly situated employees who are not within
plaintiffs protected class. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
See also Chirichigno, supra note 67, at 580. Some states prohibited employment
discrimination long before Title VII was enacted:
States began to develop laws prohibiting employment discrimination decades
before Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII was
modeled on those laws but went further than most of them, most notably by
prohibiting sex discrimination. After Title VII was enacted, all of the states that
previously lacked antidiscrimination statutes adopted them. Today, many state
employment discrimination statutes are considerably more protective of
employees' rights than the federal version.
Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, The Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and
Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 90-91 (2002). States have led the way,
although not unanimously so, in protecting against employment discrimination based upon
sexual orientation. See Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, LGBT Rights: Toward a More Perfect

380

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

meaning provide an opportunity to reinforce the reciprocal relationship of law
and culture in which law sometimes transforms attitudes and beliefs and at
other times is driven and influenced by cultural events and experience.
Employment discrimination-based problems are effective despite the
contention that entering law students are ill-equipped to handle sophisticated
areas of the law because they lack a liberal arts education and a foundation in
U.S. history and government, including the concept of federalism. 72 The 150year history surrounding the legislative enactment of federal employment
discrimination is a subject that can be readily contextualized by lecture or
through assigned readings. Looking beyond the statute, these important
historical events and cultural attitudes and beliefs provide an essential context
to understanding the law.73 While the cultural history is complex, it is easily
understood by students when it is presented in an encapsulated form as a
predicate for the legal discussion.
Title VII provides an appropriate example of impactful federal legislation.
Enacted almost 100 years after its predecessor, the Civil War Reconstruction
Era statutes, 74 Title VII is arguably "the most comprehensive and influential
Union: An Evaluation of Local Laws Requiring Government Contractors to Adopt LGBTRelated Workplace Policies, 5 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 478, 508 & n. 116 (2012) (citing 29 states
as not prohibiting sexual orientation employment discrimination). See Suzette M. Malveaux,
How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQuY 34, 43 (2011) (noting "the subtle, complex and sometimes even unconscious
nature of modern discrimination.").
Spanbauer & Lewinbuk, supra note 49, at 235.
71.
James Etienne Viator, Legal Education's Perfect Storm: Law Students' Poor
72.
Writing and Legal Analysis Skills Collide With Dismal Employment Prospects, Creating the
Urgent Need to Reconfigure the First-Year Curriculum, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 735, 753
(2012).
There are some older law review articles that trace in detail the history of the
73.
Reconstruction era legislation. See, e.g., Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981,
15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29,35-66 (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 1981, the relevant Reconstruction era employment discrimination
74.
legislation, was enacted twice, first as section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was
reenacted in 1870, pursuant to "section 5 of the fourteenth amendment as a part of the
Enforcement Act of 1870" and was "revised and recodified in 1874." Developments in the
Law, supra note 73, at 36. The relevant operative statutory language remains unchanged and
reads as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its
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antidiscrimination law in American history."7 Others have described the more
recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as the "most
sweeping piece of civil rights legislation since the Civil War era."a The
Reconstruction era, "which ended slavery and established a new system of
labor in the South based in large part on a new form of white supremacy," is
similarly one of the most important "transformative moments in U.S.
constitutional history." 77 Introducing entering students to this combination of
legislation, in tandem with its cultural context, achieves the additional goal of
providing a solid foundation in U.S. law from an historical perspective
typically addressed by a liberal arts education.78
III. CLASSROOM EXERCISES DESIGNED TO EXPLOIT CULTURAL GAPS

Using discrimination topics illustrates a teaching methodology that
explores cultural dichotomies that vividly illustrate different aspects of the U.S.
legal system. Such an approach is a useful tool for a professor who teaches
legal research, legal analysis, statutory interpretation, and the interrelationship
of statutory and case law, including the role of courts in crafting interpretive
rules. The complexity presented by administrative exhaustion requirements
and the interactions between state and federal employment discrimination laws

amendments to Section 1981, see Linda Maher, Drawing Circles in the Sand:
Extraterritorialityin Civil Rights Legislation After ARAMCO and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 9 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 1, 49 (1993).
75.
Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Note, Title VII Protections for Inmates: A Model
Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America's Prisons, Ill CoLUM. L. REv. 1048,
1061 (2011).
76.
Tim Edwards, Constitutional Limits on an Employer's Right to Dictate the
Terms of an Addict's Recovery Under the ADA: Some Sobering Concerns, 44 WAYNE L.
REV. 1679, 1696 & n.81 (1994) (quoting Senator Hatch). See also Megan McMillan, Trading
ConstitutionalPrinciplesfor Policy Ends: An Ideographic Study ofDisabilityInterest Group
and Agency Response to Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama V. Garrett, 5 J. L.
Soc'Y 501, 502 (2004).
77.
Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial
Justice Achievable in the United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 37, 69-70, n.131 (2009)
(citing Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE: 1-FOUNDATIONs 3-162 (1991) (asserting three such

transformative periods in the constitutional history of this country, "the Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal")).
78.
Leonard J. Long, Basic Economicsfor Aspiring Lawyers: A Review of Richard
A. Ippolito, Economics for Lawyers, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 219, 220 (2009) (describing a
liberal arts education as including "broader and deeper exposure to the sciences,
mathematics, history, political science, psychology, statistics, and economics").
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can be avoided in a first-year classroom through careful drafting of problems to
focus on narrow concepts and issues.79
an
provides
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 199080 ("ADA")
illustration of a comprehensive statute that is well-suited to the exploration of
cultural attitudes and beliefs. Its detailed findings and purposes sections 1
illustrate the unique function of findings and purposes, which do not command
or bind, but rather serve to explain and justify a congressional decision to
expand federal law. 8 2 It is extremely well suited to the development of
exercises illustrating their function as valuable sources of policy-based
interpretive analysis and arguments.
The numerous and detailed definitional sections provide lessons in close
reading, the importance of the interrelation of discreet statutory sections which
should not be read in isolation, as well as the need for a disciplined approach to
statutory interpretation. For example, the application of the statute turns on the

79.
In order to exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII, a "claimant must
first file a charge with the EEOC" within the applicable limitations period. Ashley R.
Wright, Note, An Ambiguous Clarification:How Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White's Resolution of a Circuit Split Creates Uncertainty in the Eighth Circuit, 61
ARK. L. REv. 161, 164 n.35 (2008). "When Congress passed Title VII [in 1964] . .. ,
Congress explicitly recognized that Title VII . . . really is meant to set a floor and not a
ceiling to employment anti-discrimination principles; that it expected, specifically, that
States and localities would provide for more expansive employment protection than Title VII
itself does." Aaron Schuham, Employment Discrimination:45 Years of Enforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Enforcement and the Future, 1 AM. U. LABOR & EMP.
L.F. 225,241 (2011).
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2006). It should be noted that this article focuses on
80.
Title I of the Act, the employment section, but there are four additional titles: Title II applies
to "public services, public employment, public communications, and public transportation,"

Title III applies to public accommodations, Title IV applies to telecommunications, and Title
V addresses application and coordination with existing state and federal law and
miscellaneous provisions. Julie M. Spanbauer, Kimel and Garrett: Another Example of the
Court Undervaluing Individual Sovereignty andSettled Expectations, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 787,
806 n.125 (2003).
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
81.
James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality:How the New Federalism
82.
May Affect the Antidiscrimination Mandate of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 91, 129 (2000) (describing the findings and purposes section of the Americans with
Disabilities Act in combination with legislative committee reports as "[t]he best sources of
legislative history").
For a discussion of the importance of teaching students to make effective policy
83.
arguments, see Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy
Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REv. 59 (2001).
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definition of an "employer," which is borrowed from Title V11 84 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.85
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agent of such person, except that, for two years
following the effective date of this title, an employer means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such person.86
This minimum employee requirement, originally intended to insulate small
employers from the potentially catastrophic costs of litigation,87 has become an
embedded cultural feature of federal employment discrimination law and
persists despite the fact that it is not premised on financial stability and despite
the fact that numerous states have lower employee threshold requirements.
Students are frequently surprised to learn that the fact of discrimination is
premised upon the size of the employer and that abstract rather than actual
economic concerns of the employer outweigh, as a matter of law, the interests
84.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). Title VII originally required 25 employees, but
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to reduce the number of employees to 15. Kendra
Samson, Note, Does Title VII Allow for LiabilityAgainst Individual Defendants?, 84 Ky. L.J.
1303, 1320 (1996). "Two other antidiscrimination statutes, the Americans with Disabilities
Act ('ADA') and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ('ADEA'), contain almost
identical definitions of 'employer.' As a result, courts use the same analysis for all three
statutes."Id at 1305.
85.
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2006).
86.
42 U.S.C. § 1211l(5)(A) (2006).
87.
Eric Allen Harris, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Equal
Opportunitiesfor Individuals with Disabilities, in Some Large Businesses, in Some Major
Cities, Sometimes. . . , 69 U. Prrr. L. REv. 657, 660 (2008) (discussing the fact that small
employers are "spared compliance and litigation expenses").
88.
Id. at 669 (explaining that "[t]his blanket rule may indeed protect some momand-pop businesses, but it is also shielding lucrative and sophisticated businesses from
compliance"). State employment discrimination laws frequently apply to smaller businesses:
The anti-disability discrimination provisions of Title 46a in Connecticut, for
instance, apply to all private employers with three or more employees. Antidisability laws in fourteen states apply to all private employers regardless of size,
but in the remaining states employers with fewer employees than the statutory
threshold escape the requirements of either the ADA or the comparable state
statutory schemes.
Zachary D. Schurin, Note & Comment, Monkey-Business: Connecticut's Six Billion Dollar
Gorilla and the Insufficiency of the Emergence of the ADA as Justification for the
Elimination ofSecond Injury Funds, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 137, 151 (2008).
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of individuals in a discrimination-free work environment. These same students
may have different cultural expectations of employment as an entitlement
rather than a privilege, due, in part, to the fact that these laws have been in
existence from the time they were born, perhaps creating a settled and broadly
held expectation on their part. 89
A contrasting definitional section also merits classroom consideration.
Unlike the limitation imposed by the minimum employee requirement, the
definition of "disability" is noteworthy because it is a reason the ADA is so
often described as one of the most sweeping federal enactments. 90
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in
paragraph (3)) . . .
(3) Regarded as having such an impairment. For purposes of paragraph
(1)(C):
(A) An individual meets the requirement of "being regarded as having
such an impairment" if the individual establishes that he or she has
been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.
(B) Paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to impairments that are transitory
and minor. A transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or
expected duration of 6 months or less.91
Accordingly, an individual who has no substantially limiting impairment
may seek the same protections afforded to those who do have such impairment
provided the former individual is perceived by an employer as having a
qualifying impairment. 9 2 This provision is consistent with the body of

89.
In fact, laws such as Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act operate as
incursions on the employment at will doctrine, the latter of which historically rendered
employment a privilege rather than an entitlement. See Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of
Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile
Judiciary,33 DEL. J.CoRP. L. 347, 355 (2008).
90.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006).
91.
92.
§ 12102(C).
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employment discrimination law pre-dating its enactment in the sense that
discrimination is defined from the perspective of the alleged discriminator
rather than from the experience of the victim. 93 Unlike other discrimination
laws, however, the ADA is expansive in terms of coverage in that it does not
require that a victim be a member of a protected class in the traditional
understanding of employment discrimination law. 94 Student views on what it
means to discriminate and to experience discrimination can be explored and
compared with the legislative meaning.95
If classroom time is available to explore various discrimination statutes, the
ADA can either be included at the beginning as an introduction to a
comprehensive statute or can be included at the end as a capstone to this
exploration. 9 6 Discussing the statute may prove useful for faculty who view
this law as of recent vintage given their contextualized understanding of
discrimination law.97 For many students entering law school, however, the

In terms of claims of disparate treatment, under Title VII, the Americans with
93.
Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the
employer took the employment action "because of' her protected status. Title VII
prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The ADA prohibits
discrimination against a qualified individual "because of' her disability. Similarly,
the ADEA prohibits discrimination against an individual "because of' her age.
Miriam Kim, Comment, Discrimination in the Wen Ho Lee Case: Reinterpretingthe Intent
Requirement in Constitutionaland Statutory Race Discrimination Cases, 9 ASIAN L.J. 117,
154 (2002).
94.
Courts have distinguished the ADA from Title VII, the latter of which "'says
nothing about protection of persons who are perceived to belong to a protected class."' Craig
Robert Senn, Perception over Reality: Extending the ADA's Concept of "Regarded as"
Protection UnderFederalEmployment DiscriminationLaw, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 827, 859,
n. 154 (2009) (quoting Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004)).
95.
For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see supra notes 117-130 and
accompanying text.
The Americans with Disabilities Act was signed on July 26, 1990, but
96.
"progressive implementation of its provisions did not begin until Jan. 1992. The general
effective date for the public services and public accommodations titles was 26 Jan. 1992; the
general effective date for entities with 25 or more employees was 26 July 1992; and the
general effective date for entities with 15-24 employees was 26 July 1994." David M.
Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, HIV Infection and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An
Evolving Interaction,549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 84, 86 n. 10 (1997).
Its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.,
97.
"provided limited employment protection for 'handicapped' employees of the federal
government, federal contractors, and recipients of federal aid." Edward J. McGraw,
Compliance Costs of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 521, 521 n.1
(1993).
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ADA and the protected class it creates has constructed the students' cultural
have
same students
understanding of the concept of disability.98 These
witnessed disability accommodation as a routine part of their own classroom
experience. 99
What the students may not know is that the ADA is deemed by some a
failure. 00 Since the ADA's effective date, studies conducted by the Center for
Disease Control, the Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor "all show a
measurable drop in disabled employment," with the Current Population Survey
revealing "a nearly 5% national employment rate decline, from 1994 (24%) to
2004 (19.3%).,,1o Students for whom disability accommodation is a routine
part of the classroom experience may be surprised to learn that some experts
advocate that the ADA be repealed because the experts believe the costs of
accommodation create a disincentive for employers to hire disabled workers.102
Law professors can also explore this body of employment discrimination
law with a classroom discussion eliciting student views on their understanding
of the meaning of a distinct type of discrimination, i.e., race discrimination, to
be followed by an exercise exploring the meaning of race first through the lens
of Section 1981,103 and then through the lens of Title VII.'0 A simple fact
pattern could be:
Mary was born in Mexico and moved to the United States with her
parents when she was sixteen years old. Mary is a United States
citizen. She was recently denied employment. She believes she was
the victim of discrimination.' 0 5

98.
American Bar Association data covering the Fall 2003 entering class through the
Fall 2008 entering class indicates "that highest percentage category of entering law students
is for ages twenty-three to twenty-five." Judith L. Ritter, Growin' Up: An Assessment of
Adult Self-Image in ClinicalLaw Students, 44 AKRON L. REv. 137, 145 n.52 (2011).
99.
For a discussion of the accommodations afforded to learning disabled students,
see W. Ray Williams, Annual Survey of the United States Supreme Court and Federal Law:
Hand-Up or Handout? The Americans with Disabilities Act and "Unreasonable
Accommodation" of Learning Disabled Bar Applicants: Toward a New Paradigm, 34
CREIGHTON L. REv. 611,649-56 (2001).

100. Schurin, supra note 88, at 155.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
105. Any facts regarding the nature of the alleged acts of discrimination have been
intentionally omitted. If students ask for more factual detail, they are informed that they
have been assigned the first level of inquiry - whether Mary, the potential plaintiff, is within
the class protected by the statute.
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Students can be asked a threshold question of statutory interpretation:
whether either statute potentially applies to Mary's discrimination claim.106
The fact pattern is designed to illustrate the importance of historical cultural
context to legislation, the need to ascertain legal definitions as either contained
in a comprehensive statute or as crafted by courts, and the cultural gap
separating lay and legal understandings of discrimination. If the students are
not provided any information beyond the language of these two statutory
sections, they will be required to isolate and focus upon the relevant language
in both statutes in an attempt to ascertain plain or ordinary meaning,'o0
beginning first with Section 1981: "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .,,0

After

much

discussion, students generally conclude that although the statutory language,
"white citizens" is crucial to ascertaining whether Mary is protected by Section
1981, it must be read in conjunction with the broad language, "[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States.,109 Many students conclude that
given the breadth of this latter language, it is likely that Mary falls within the
class protected by Section 1981.
Students are more likely to quickly conclude that Mary is protected by the
following, more specific language in Title VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
After initially discussing both statutes and their application to the fact
pattern, students are provided greater context in being informed that the two
statutes were enacted approximately 100 years apart. When asked which
statute appears to be a product of the Twentieth Century and which was enacted

106. The minimum employee requirement can also be examined in the context of
these facts under Title VII. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. In order to further
simplify and focus this threshold issue of statutory application, Mary is described as being a
U.S. citizen. For a discussion of the application of Section 1981 to alienage claims, see
Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1998) (commenting that "[flew cases have
addressed whether Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of alienage").
107. For a discussion of plain or ordinary meaning, see SCALIA & GARNER, infra note
116, at 436.
108. 42U.S.C.§ 1981(a)(2006).
109. Id.

110.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
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in the Nineteenth Century, some students point to Section 1981 as the more
contemporary piece of legislation, believing it to be more expansive in its
language protecting "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States,"
unqualified by racial or other classification. When these same students
learn that Section 1981 was originally passed immediately after the Civil War
and was enacted to protect recently freed slaves,"l 2 some students may more
confidently conclude that Mary is not protected by this piece of legislation
because she is not African American.
A class discussion as to the manner in which the language of the statute
could be interpreted to protect Mary rarely reveals the analysis actually
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1987 decision answering a similar
issue of statutory application.1 3 The different lower court opinions also
provide insight into the different approaches the courts have utilized in
attempting to differentiate
between race, national origin, and ethnicity and in fitting individuals
into particular protected categories. The suit was brought by a U.S.
citizen born in Iraq, who believed he was denied tenure because of his
Arab origin and Muslim religion. The Federal District Court initially
held that a section 1981 action could be maintained "because the
complaint alleged denial of tenure because respondent was of the
Arabian race." Upon a motion for summary judgment, a different
judge "construed the pleadings as asserting only discrimination on the
basis of national origin and religion" and ruled that section 1981 did
not reach "claims of discrimination based on Arabian ancestry." This
language illustrates the difficulties in isolating discrimination based on
race. The Court of Appeals held that "although under current racial
classifications Arabs are Caucasians," when Congress passed section
1981 it intended to protect persons against discrimination based on "at
the least, membership in a group that is ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive."
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that despite "a common popular understanding that there
are three major human races - Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid[,
m]any modem biologists

and anthropologists . .. criticize

racial

classifications as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the
variability of human beings" leading "some, but not all, scientists to
conclude that racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical,
rather than biological, in nature."
Nonetheless, the majority

111.

42U.S.C.§ 1981(a) (2006).

112.
113.

See Comment, supra note 73, at 33.
St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
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recognized that section 1981 protection was limited to "racial
discrimination" and framed its decision in these terms: "Congress
intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons
who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their
ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial
discrimination ... ." Thus, despite conceding the difficulties in
defining race, the U.S. Supreme Court did not challenge racial
categorization per se but made it more inclusive.1 14
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied upon nineteenth century
dictionaries and encyclopedias to provide meaning to these legislatively created
racial classifications and to conclude that a U.S. citizen who had been born in
Iraq was entitled to protection under Section 1981.115 The opinion provides an
opportunity for discussion of the role of legislative history, how it is created,
and what types of legislative history courts are inclined to invoke as a window
into cultural context to aid statutory interpretation. Simultaneously, it invites
discussion of the various interpretive perspectives, including textualism, and
the potential problems with such approaches. 1 6
Again, this process urges students to ask themselves whether their own
cultural context and their view of the meaning of race interfered with or
perhaps rendered them unable to view race through a different cultural lens.
Students are also asked to consider the ways in which the legal construction of
race is at odds with their personal views. The language in Section 1981, "the

114. Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and
Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REv. 261, 322-24 (1997). For additional
discussion of the case, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Termination: Legal Rights and
PracticalEffects When FranchiseesClaim the FranchisorDiscriminates, 35 AM. Bus. L.J.
559, 610 n. 254 (quoting St. Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613). The Court also indicated that
this interpretation was supported by legislative history. St. FrancisColl., 481 U.S. at 612.
115. "These dictionary and encyclopedic sources are somewhat diverse, but it is clear
that they do not support the claim that for the purposes of § 1981, Arabs, Englishmen,
Germans, and certain other ethnic groups are to be considered a single race." Id
116.

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

LEGAL TEXTS 432 (2012) (defining legislative history as "proceedings leading to the
enactment of a statute, including legislative hearings, committee reports, and floor debates").
One problem in relying on legislative intent as a basis for a particular statutory interpretation
is that it "can render the interpretation of statutes inappropriately unresponsive to changes in
the interpretive environment over time." LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 83 (2010). Justice Scalia advocates an
"austere" version of textualism, which another self-described textualist, Judge Frank

Easterbrook, argues that "'the choice among meanings [of words in statutes] must have a
footing more solid than a dictionary-which is a museum of words, an historical catalog
rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures."' Richard A. Posner, The
Incoherence ofAntonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 2012 (book review).
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same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens" can only be understood by what
it meant to be African American prior to the Civil War Reconstruction era
legislation. Students may be asked to consider whether the answer should be
found in the language of an 1857 U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the
Court determined that Dred Scott was not "a citizen for purposes of federal
court jurisdiction."' 1 7
The question is simply this: Can a negro whose ancestors were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the
political community formed and brought into existence by the
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all
the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by the instrument
to the citizen?' 8
The Court provided a negative answer to this question and "went even
further, holding that 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' were
coextensive and that even 'free negroes' were not part of 'this people' as
contemplated in the U.S. Constitution."' 1 9 Because being white was part and
parcel of being a citizen, it is not surprising that the first federal employment
discrimination legislation defined race in relationship to white privilege.120
Thus, "the construction of race is the construction of relationships. The
relationship context creates a dualism-whites or nonwhites-and allows races
to be defined against one another by reference to what other races are and are
not." ' Students might also be asked to consider whether the current legal
construct of race, which "invokes biologically based human characteristics (socalled 'phenotypes')," should continue in light of the scientific community
findings that "no biological basis for distinguishing human groups along the
lines of race."12 2 Students can also be encouraged by the professor to evaluate
current proof requirements that may not be effective in combating the most
common type of discrimination, which is the product of unconscious
stereotypes and bias prevalent in contemporary society.' 23

117. Saito, supra note 114, at 270. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
403 (1857) (holding Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, and the Court, therefore, lacked
jurisdiction over his claim).
118. Id.
119. Saito, supra note 114, at 270 (quoting Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403).
120. See Chris K. lijima, The Era of We-Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of
Asian Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black/White
Paradigm,29 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 47, 52 n.12 (1997).
121. Id
122. Saito, supra note 114, at 283.
123. Katherine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of
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At this point in the discussion, students should begin to understand the
need to self-consciously assess their judgments and assumptions, particularly
when exploring an older statute and any previously unexplored area of law. A
final exercise will remind them that cultural context is important to
understanding contemporary law. The students will be shown a televised
debate between Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, the principal
democratic opponent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey of Minnesota, the Act's principal democratic proponent, on the eve
of the introduction of the bill into the Senate.124 Although this debate occurred
less than fifty years ago, the students will likely be shocked and offended by
Senator Thurmond's racist arguments made against the law.
Senator Thurmond described the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as affording preferential rights to some at the expense of the constitutional
rights of others. 125 He also blamed the victims of race discrimination, arguing
that the bill would vest preferential rights in "a favored few who vote in block"
and who take part in "lawless riots."' 26 He declared the bill to be an attempt to
"appease those waging a vicious campaign of civil disobedience" and warned
that enacting the bill into law would "only encourage further mob violence."l 27
His comments were especially troubling given "the televised violence in the
South against peaceful civil rights demonstrators" that was occurring during
this time. 128 He inaccurately described the bill as requiring racial balance.
Indeed, when Thurmond asked, "[w]hose jobs are these negroes and minorities
going to take?" 29 He suggested that if enacted, it would result in whites losing
their jobs.130

Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination,95 VA. L. REv. 1893, 1895-96
(2009).
124. DVD: Birth Struggle of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CBS Television Network
Broadcast Mar. 18, 1964), available at www.films.com (Films for the Humanities &
Sciences) [hereinafter DVD]. Both Humphrey and Thurmond were democrats. Id
Thurmond was one of nineteen senators opposing the Civil Rights. Id. Opponents in the
senate led a filibuster that went on for 534 hours, one minute, and 51 seconds, lasting a total
of 77days. Id The bill was approved by the senate on June 19, 1964 by a vote of 73 to 27. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Michael R. Kuffner, Commentary: From Public Schools to Public Libraries:
Examining the Impact of Brown v. Board of Education on the Desegregation of Public
Libraries,59 ALA. L. REv. 1247, 1258 (2008). In fact, experts argue that "televised violence
in the South against peaceful black civil rights demonstrators dramatically disgusted the
nation and directly led to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Id
129. See DVD, supra note 124.
130. Id.
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Although Senator Humphrey characterized the bill as "moderate,
reasonable, and bi-partisan," he also considered it necessary to respond to the
"great moral challenge ... to the conscience of the nation."' The
students
might be surprised, however, by their discomfort with some of Senator
Humphrey's statements and language contrasting African Americans and the
limited civil rights they enjoyed with the rights enjoyed by "very unsavory
characters," including "people who have little or no good reputation" and
"people who come from foreign countries."1 3 2 The students will be asked to
consider whether his suspicion and skepticism of noncitizens reflected an
entrenched, perhaps unconscious, understanding of white citizenship as the
benchmark of privilege against which all other group rights were measured.13 3
The students are then asked to consider how much the law has changed
cultural beliefs and to reflect upon Senator Thurmond's statement: "[y]ou can't
do some things by law. Some things must come in the hearts and minds of the
people." 134 They are also reminded that this is legislative history they can see
and hear that has not been preserved only in written form. The students are
then asked to consider what they might have witnessed had this technology
been available when the Civil War Reconstruction era statutes, such as Section
1981, were debated.
This exercise is intended to bring legislative history to life and to reinforce
how important it is to consider the cultural context of those who made the law,
the current cultural context within which the law operates, and the cultural
views and understandings students bring to the law when they attempt to
interpret it. Professors can construct this and other similar exercises to assist
them in focusing on student learning by navigating the shifting cultural context
of law over time and its potential divergence from the students' own cultural
perspectives.
CONCLUSION

A professor who focuses classroom discussion on identifying the cultural
perspectives of the students and introducing them to law through a cultural lens
is simultaneously teaching students to become aware of their cultural
perspective, while simultaneously aiding students to self-consciously compare
their perspective with the shifting cultural context of the law. Teaching this
technique of self-assessment is not only critical to a lawyer's development as a
lifelong student of the ever-changing legal landscape, it also is a partial
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id
Id.
See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
See DVD, supra note 124.
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response to looming ABA directives regarding assessment and to negative
public opinions about the value of legal education. Learning this process of
self-assessment early in law school will enable students to measure their own
grasp of classroom material no matter what pedagogy or technique a professor
might use. Moreover, professors will benefit from adopting a cultural
perspective in the classroom. A professor's scholarship, even traditional
scholarship, may be enriched because the professor who elicits and responds to
the cultural perspectives of students in the classroom will better understand
societal perceptions of the law, which should provide new avenues for
traditional and nontraditional scholarship.
The technique of using culture in the classroom does not require seismic
shifts in law school teaching. Rather, it employs the modest addition of
regularly changing the focus of the discussion to illuminate dichotomies in the
cultural context of the law's development and the students' cultural perception
of the law. A natural product of this student-centered environment will be that
students learn to self-assess. This process of self-assessment represents an
important aspect of the academy understanding of effective teaching in law
school classrooms.

